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The National Banking System in the U.S. in the latter half of the 19 th century was famously fragmented. Due to legal restrictions on branching, it consisted almost entirely of individual unit banks limited to single offices. This structure made it considerably more difficult for banks to tap sources of funding or conduct extensive business outside their immediate location. Meanwhile, commerce in the US economy expanded geographically as developments in transportation, such as the expansion of the railroad, reduced the costs of moving people and goods. Expanding trade increased the needs of bank customers to be able to conduct long distance transactions. Interbank relationships were thus an integral part of the response by the banking system as they enabled banks to obtain funding from other banks, either via longer-term interbank relationships or through shorter-term borrowing, and as they facilitated clearing payments across cities or regions (Conway and Patterson 1914 , James 1978 , Lockhart 1921 , White 1983 ).
The fragmented structure of the US banking system has also been blamed for the instability it experienced (Bordo, Redish, and Rockoff 1996, Calomiris 1993) . The local nature of deposits has been argued to have made institutions more vulnerable to runs. Additionally, interbank connections have been suggested as a way that panics might have spread, especially to the extent that banks depended on interbank deposits as a source of liquidity. During a panic, these deposits might have become less useful as a liquidity source, either because distance made them unable to be accessed immediately or because the holder of the deposits may have suspended redemption of the deposits.
In this paper, we add considerably to our knowledge of the interbank networks of the National Banking Era; despite the importance of this network for the operation and fragility of the financial system in this period, the way that this network was structured has received scant attention. In particular, we describe in detail the interbank networks, investigate the factors that contributed to different banks adopting very different levels of connection to the interbank system, and examine whether the interbank network contributed to transmitting stresses in the banking system during the banking panics. We conduct our analysis using individual correspondent relationships identified in the examination reports of National Banks. 1 These reports list the legal correspondents with whom the National Banks placed funds and the amounts they held with each individual correspondent on the day of the examination. Having information on the balances is significant as it provides us an indication of the strength of the relationship.
When considering the networks, we focus on a selected sample of institutions for which interbank connections would likely be the most important and that were located in the parts of the country where the Panic was most severe. In particular, we look at banks located in many of the larger cities in the South and West of the country. Our data offers the most detail about the connections with the three "central reserve cities" of New York, Chicago, and St. Louis, so our analysis focuses mostly on these relationships, but also offers some insight into other connections. Connections with the central reserve cities were among the most important that banks would have and balances at these correspondents accounted for, on average, nearly half of all interbank balances and about six percent of total assets.
A map showing the intercity connections listed by banks in each city in our sample is shown in Figure 1 (large dots indicate cities in our sample, smaller dots are cities where banks have correspondents). Banks throughout the country maintained linkages with the larger cities on East Coast as well as the cities of Chicago and St. Louis, consistent with both trade needs and the pyramidal reserve structure. While all banks report having at least one correspondent, some banks had considerably more extensive networks with as many as eighteen correspondents in as many as seven or eight cities. Network structures could vary considerably, even for banks within the same city (Figure 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b) . With respect to the central reserve cities, the dominance of New York City in the interbank network is very clear with nearly every bank in our sample having an agent there; some banks had as many as 6 correspondents in the city. As illustrated in Figures 2a and 3a , some banks opted to establish connections with the other two central reserve cities as well, while, as shown in Figures 2b and 3b , other banks did not. About three-fourths of the banks in our sample had at least one correspondent in Chicago while only one-third had a correspondent in St. Louis.
We next explore the factors that gave rise to particular network structures maintained by different banks. Characterizing networks can be somewhat challenging so we look at a variety of measures that capture different aspects. Among the items we consider are the size of balances held with correspondents, the number of correspondent connections, the number of cities in which the bank had correspondents, and the concentration of balances held with correspondents.
As banks within the same cities established different correspondent networks, some of the factors shaping network decisions must be related to bank level factors. One of the more important sets of determinants that we examine is the services provided by the correspondent banks and the business models of the banks that took advantage of these services. The first services we consider are related to the role correspondent banks played in processing transactions. We test whether banks that were more likely to need access to payment services, such as those with more checking deposits, had particular network structures (James 1978, James and Weiman 2010) . Second, balances held in the central reserve cities counted toward legal reserve requirements and some contemporaries argued that this pushed balances toward these cities (Willis 1922) . We look to see if banks that relied particularly strongly on their correspondent balances to satisfy their reserve requirements had different correspondent relationships than other banks. Third, correspondents in major financial centers were close to both money markets and securities markets and they facilitated investment in those markets for banks that held balances with them and also provided their respondent banks with some credit analysis of the securities being offered for sale (Gendreau 1979 , James 1978 , Phillips 1924 . A fourth service provided by correspondents was access to short-term funds, which could be important for meeting spikes in loan demand such as during harvest season (Calomiris and Gorton 1991 , Kemmerer 1910 , Miron 1986 . We look at whether needs for such borrowing shaped network structure.
Presumably, local level factors impacted the shape of network connections as well. The customer base, for instance, may have been an important influence on network structures. Different customers, such as individuals, nonfinancial businesses, and other banks, may have looked for different services from their banks and preferred banks with different arrangements of network connections. The distance of the locality to various financial centers also likely played a role in shaping the networks.
One concern is that some of the variables we use to indicate whether different correspondent services would be valuable to the bank may be endogenous with respect to the structure of the network.
Fortunately, the data set we use provides us with a number of variables that can serve as instruments.
These variables pertain to the governance structure of the bank and the occupations of the nonmanagement members of the Board of Directors. The non-management directors may have shaped the general business model of the bank, such as preferences for particular types of loans, and thus influenced the variables about which there may be endogeneity concerns. However, these directors were not involved in the particulars of the operations of the bank and were thus unlikely to directly influence the network variables we consider (See Alcorn 1908, Bolles 1890, and Coffin 1896).
We find that the services provided by central reserve city agents were indeed important in determining the number of correspondents and the intensity of the connections. Banks that relied more extensively on checking deposits tended to have a more concentrated network structure and, in particular, to favor having more balances at a smaller number of agents in New York City. Banks that appear to have valued their correspondent relationships for the investment opportunities they provided also preferred agents in New York City, but preferred to have more of such agents. Banks that used correspondent banks to manage reserves appear to have held more of their interbank balances at central reserve cities; this is true both for country banks and banks in reserve cities. Banks that used short-term funding concentrated their balances at fewer agents.
Local factors also mattered. Having more non-financial firms as potential customers is associated with a bank having more agents in more locations. Distance strongly influenced choice of correspondents, with banks preferring agents closer to them. We also find more limited evidence that banks in more agricultural areas preferred to have agents in more places.
Finally, we consider whether the networks mattered for bank outcomes during the panic. If banks kept their liquid assets with other banks, then they might not have been able to access those during a panic. In part, this may have been simply because the funds were physically far away and would take some time to be retrieved. Alternatively, New York Clearinghouse banks, which as noted above played a key role in the interbank system, suspended convertibility of interbank deposits during the panic because they were overwhelmed by the demands placed on them. Such a suspension would have meant that banks holding more funds there would have suffered a particularly substantial liquidity shock. In the panic of 1893, the suspension of the New York Clearinghouse took place mid-way through the panic and we look to see whether this change had implications for the impact of balances held with agents.
We find having greater balances in New York increased the likelihood that banks closed, especially if they held more due to banks, which tended to be more volatile. Thus banks that appear to have played a particular role in being intermediaries between other banks and New York appear to have been most vulnerable during this part of the crisis. This finding is consistent with the narrative description of events in some cities by Wicker (2000) .
We also find that, prior to the suspension of New York, balances held in Chicago or St. Louis are not associated with changes in the likelihood that a bank failed. However, after the suspension in New
York having more balances with banks in these other cities becomes associated with a stronger likelihood of suspension. Balances held in New York continue to be associated with closure, but the liability base of the bank no longer appears to be so important. These findings are more consistent with the idea that it was the inaccessibility of these balances as a source of immediate liquidity that mattered at this point.
Further supporting this idea, we find that balances held with central reserve cities were more likely to increase the likelihood of closure the farther away from these cities the bank was located.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First it contributes to our understanding of the development of the financial sector in the US. While there has been work on the payment system and on use of correspondents in the National Banking Era, most of this work has either characterized the interbank network in broad terms (James 1978 , James and Weiman 2010 , White 1983 or has focused on how it shaped banking in New York (James and Weiman 2011, Tallman and Moen 2012) . There is very little information on the details of the network structure for this time. One paper that has looked in detail at network structure is Weber (2003) , which looks at the networks of banks in Pennsylvania in the 1850s.
He finds that trade linkages were important in shaping network structures. We also find evidence that trade networks were important, but are able to explore the importance of other banking services as well.
More importantly, this paper complements Weber's work as it shows how banking networks looked 50 years later and thus helps illustrate how the banking networks evolved as the US economy expanded, both in area and size, and as needs for different banking services changed.
This paper also adds to the growing work on networks, especially those of banks, and the relation to financial stability. Allen and Gale (2002) provide a number of theoretical examples regarding how different network structures could either enhance stability or transmit instability. Much subsequent work has looked at other network shapes and relationships. This paper illustrates what the network in the US actually looked like and helps explain why it had the shape that it did. It also helps illustrate how that network structure was related to the stability of the system.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the data. In Section 3, we describe the interbank correspondent network in some detail. We review the various factors that might have shaped the networks in Section 4 and present the results of our analysis of the role these factors played in shaping the network connections in Section 5. Section 6 reports our investigations into the role the networks played in the Panic of 1893. Section 7 concludes.
Section 2. The data
Our sample contains 208 banking institutions and consists of all the national banks located in 38
cities. As national banks (i.e., those chartered by the federal government), these institutions were subject to the same set of rules and regulations regardless of where they were located. All the banks were unit, or single office, banks, which makes it easier to control for differences in local economic conditions. National banks were required to provide information to the Comptroller of the Currency, their primary regulator, several times a year. One method was through the Call Report, which contains information on the banks' balance sheets and was filed about five times a year. The second method of providing information consisted of Examination Reports filed by examiners who visited each bank once or twice a year. To be included in our sample, the banks needed to have provided information for the September 1892 Call Report and to have had at least one Examination Report completed prior to May 1893 (the onset of the Panic). Those are the Reports that provide the information used for the analysis. The cities covered in the sample include many of the larger cities in the Western and Southern parts of the United States. 3 We focus on this part of the country because the panic was focused here. As we are interested most in the interbank connections, we focus on banks and communities where interbank connections were likely to play a more substantial role. As described more below, banks were divided into three groups based on their location: those in central reserve cities, in reserve cities, and county banks. All the reserve cities in the West and South are included in our sample as are many of the other larger cities that might have served as regional hubs even if they were not officially reserve cities.
Section 2.2. Primary Data Sources
The Examination Reports provide a wealth of information regarding the assets, liabilities, and governance of the bank. 4 For the purposes of our analysis, the most valuable material is related to the relationships with reserve agents. In particular, the examiner reported the amount that was due from each agent and the name of each of those agents. That these were recorded for purposes related to regulatory reserve requirements has several implications for us. Beneficially it meant that the examiner would verify these amounts by sending postcards to the institutions listed as reserve agents; any discrepancies, of which there were very few, were then noted and an explanation provided. It also meant that only balances which could be used to satisfy legal reserve requirements were required to be listed. Thus, for banks in reserve cities, only amounts due from banks in central reserve cities were required to be listed; amounts due from banks in other reserve cites need not have been enumerated. Similarly, for country banks, amounts due from banks in central reserve cities and from banks in reserve cities were enumerated, while amounts due from other country banks did not need to be. The structure of these listings has important implications for how we analyse the data. On occasion, the examiner would provide more information than was required, for instance listing amounts due from banks in other reserve cities for some reserve city banks. This information provides us with a more complete picture of what the networks look like, but is not provided often enough for more formal analysis.
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The examination reports also describe whether the bank borrowed on a collateralized basis from other banks, the amounts of those borrowings, and identity of the lender. Most of these borrowings took the form of rediscounts or bills payable. However some took the form of collateralized certificates of deposit; which examiners viewed as a general substitute for the other types of borrowing, but one which was not always listed in other report forms, such as the Call Report.
The examinations also provide information about the ownership structure and the corporate governance of the banks. 6 For instance, the reports provide detailed information regarding the extent of ownership by the bank's management and its board, as well as the information about use of oversight committees and frequency with which the board met. We use some of this information to control for the risk preferences of the bank. The examination reports also provide information about the occupations of the board members that were not a part of the ownership team. We use this information to give us some insights regarding the types of businesses operating locally and that the bank might lend to. These governance and board membership attributes provide the instruments we use later. As distance presumably influenced decisions, we collect data on the distance of each city from each of the central reserve cities. Finally, we include several variables related to the economic environment in which the bank operated. These include variables from the censuses, such as population and number of manufacturing businesses of the county and the share of state income from agriculture as opposed to manufacturing.
All variables, their definitions, and their sources appear in Table 1 . Summary statistics for these variables appear in Table 2 .
Section 3. Description of the banking and correspondent relationships
Correspondent relationships between banks were valuable for a variety of reasons: but of particular importance for regulators was the part they played in holding banks, legal reserves. Given their importance as part of the regulatory requirements, these relationships were monitored by the regulators.
According to Coffin (1896), a bank had to formally submit an application to the Comptroller of the Currency (the chief regulator of national banks) stating that it wanted a particular bank to be able to hold a portion of its reserve. As noted earlier, balances reported to be held at the correspondents were verified 7 Although real estate lending was "prohibited" by national banks, national banks nonetheless found ways to lend against real estate. A loan made without real estate as collateral could become collateralized by real estate if the creditworthiness of the borrower deteriorated.
as part of the examination process. Thus, we are quite confident in the quality of the information in the examination reports. In this section, we describe the correspondent networks we observe and discuss some of the variables we will use in our formal analysis to quantify different aspects of the networks.
Section 3.1 Overall amount of interbank activity
Given our sample, it is helpful to start by characterizing the general connectedness of our banks to the interbank system. In general, our banks appear to be more connected to the interbank system than other banks in the states in which they were located. This is not surprising given that our sample consists notably of Reserve City banks, which were intended to be intermediate banks between the country banks and the banks in the central reserve cities. Across our sample of banks, the average ratio of deposits by other banks (which includes due from national banks and from state banks) to assets was 13.2 percent.
The average ratio of deposits in other banks (which includes due from reserve agents, other national banks, and from state banks) was 12.6 percent.
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Section 3.2 Relationships with the central reserve cities
The relationships about which we have the most complete information are those with the central reserve city banks. We look at a variety of measures to characterize different aspects of the relationships of our banks with their correspondents. Some of these are related to the intensity of the connections while others look at the distribution of connections. The summary statistics for these measures are shown in the upper portion of Table 2 .
One important measure is the share of all interbank deposits that are held with central reserve city agents. As shown in Table 2 , these relationships tended to represent a very sizeable portion of banks' interbank connections; deposits at central reserve city banks, on average, accounted for 46 percent of all deposits due from banks but reached as high as 94 percent. An alternative approach to looking at the importance of interbank connections is the number of such connections maintained by each bank. The number of central reserve city correspondents maintained by the banks in our sample averaged about 3 but ranged to as many as 12.
All of the banks in our sample except one had a correspondent in New York City. This is perhaps not too surprising given the role that New York played in the payment system and that, with its large money and securities markets, New York offered access to some items that may have been less available elsewhere. We measure the importance of New York by looking the volume of deposits held at banks in New York as a share of deposits held with all central reserve city banks. For most of our banks, this share exceeded 50 percent.
We also look at the number of correspondents within each central reserve city. As nearly every bank had a correspondent relationship with a bank in New York, we consider instead whether each bank maintained multiple correspondents within the New York. One bank had 6 such correspondents. By contrast, only about a third of the banks in our sample had such a relationship with a bank in St Louis, despite the skew in the sample toward banks located in the West and South. Chicago was somewhere in the middle. Many, though certainly not all, of the banks in our sample had a correspondent in Chicago and about 20 percent of our sample had multiple correspondent banks there. Thus for St. Louis and Chicago, we consider simply whether each bank maintained a correspondent there.
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Our final measure of network connection is the concentration of balances at the central reserve cities. In particular, we use the ratio of value of the largest deposit balance held at any central reserve city correspondent to the total amount of balances at all central reserve banks, conditional on having three or more such correspondents. For some banks, balances at a single central reserve city correspondent represented more than 90 percent of central reserve city balances, though this was exceptional. On average the balance at the largest correspondent was about 54 percent of central reserve city balances, which still implies notable concentration.
We illustrate how a few of the measures of the shape of the correspondent networks varied with different bank attributes in Table 3 ; these results help motivate some of the analysis we conduct below.
Looking first by size, we see that banks in the top size quartile had more correspondents and held more of their deposits with other banks in central reserve city correspondents. Banks in the smallest quartile of assets tended to hold their central reserve city correspondent balances with banks in New York rather than with banks in Chicago or St. Louis.
The location of the banks clearly mattered. Banks farther away from New York tended to have fewer agents and to have held a smaller portion of their interbank balances with banks in central reserve 9 In his discussion of banks in Pennsylvania, Weber (2003) finds that most of these banks had a correspondent in Philadelphia. He further finds that the correspondent market in Philadelphia was fairly competitive and fairly fluid. We find that the New York City correspondent market also looks fairly competitive with the top 5 banks each having relationships with between 10 and 20 percent of the banks in our sample. By contrast, in Chicago, one bank had a considerably greater share of the market, holding balances with about 25 percent of the banks in our sample, while the next closest Chicago bank had a relationship with just under 10 percent of the sample. Banks in reserve cities had more central reserve city agents. Banks in reserve cities also held more of the due to banks with central reserve city correspondents; this is consistent with the idea that the legal requirements might have affected the distribution of reserves because reserve city banks did not get "credit" for balances held in reserve city banks.
Based on these measures, the banks in our sample are more connected to the interbank system than the Pennsylvania banks studied by Weber (2003) . Our average "due from banks" and "due to banks" are larger than in his sample. The banks in our sample also appear to have connections to banks in more places than do his. For instance, as noted here and below, country banks in our sample often had connections to more financial centers (central reserve cities and reserve cities), than did the Pennsylvania banks in the 1850s. Moreover, the banks in the largest city in his sample, Philadelphia, are reported to have had little connection with New York City whereas the banks in the larger cities in our sample are even more connected to New York (and Chicago/St. Louis) than other banks. Thus, while some of the differences observed could be due to locational factors, the differences in the connections also suggest that as the U.S. economy was growing, these interbank connections became even more important.
Section 3.3 Relationships with reserve cities
There are 130 country banks in our sample. All but about 10 percent of these banks had agents in at least one reserve city. Just over 40 percent of these banks had a correspondent in only one city.
Nevertheless, there were a few banks that had agents in four or more reserve cities. In our formal analysis below, we look at whether the number of reserve cities in which country banks had correspondents is related to various factors.
The five most commonly cited reserve cities were Kansas City, MO (more country banks listed Kansas City as a having one of their reserve agents than listed St. Louis); Omaha, NE; St. Paul, MN;
Cincinnati, OH; and Boston, MA. It is perhaps somewhat surprising that Boston would be amount the most frequently cited cities given that the sample is drawn from banks in the West and South. This finding may reflect the importance Boston played in the economy at this time.
Section 4. The factors influencing the correspondent network patterns
In this section we describe some of the factors that potentially influenced the interbank network structure. These factors include the services offered by the correspondents, the location of the bank relative to the central reserve cities, and the potential customer base of the bank. We also discuss whether there are potential endogeneity concerns about these variables.
Section 4.1 Services offered by the correspondents
One of the notable prudential bank regulations of the National Banking Era is that the national banks were subject to a reserve requirement. Banks were required to hold a certain amount of "liquid assets" (cash or deposits with reserve agents) relative to their deposits (where deposits were measured as the sum of individual deposits and net interbank deposits-due to banks minus due from banks); the calculation used by the examiners is described in detail in Coffin (1896). 10 The particulars of the reserve requirements varied by the location of the bank. At the top of system were banks located in the central reserve cities of New York, Chicago, and St. Louis. These banks were required to hold reserves of 25 percent of their deposits all of which needed to be held as cash. Banks in reserve cities, other relatively large cities, were also required to hold a reserve equal to 25 percent of their deposits, but they were allowed to hold half of it in the form of deposits at their agent banks in central reserves cities. Most national banks were "country banks" located in smaller cities. These banks were required to hold a reserve equal to 15 percent of deposits, up to 3/5 of the reserve could be held as interbank deposits at agent banks in either reserve cities or central reserve cities. Agent banks typically paid interest on balances placed with them, generally about 2 percent (James 1978, Examiner reports).
These reserve requirements were not especially severe. Myers (1931) argues that the requirements were initially set largely by simply requiring the conditions that were currently in place.
Most of the banks in our sample had cash reserves that notably exceeded the legal requirement. However, some banks maintained cash holdings that were very close to the legal minimums. These banks may have been particularly attuned to the distribution of their due from banks to avoid falling below the regulatory requirement which may in turn affect where these banks held balances. We indicate such banks as those with "low cash reserves" defined as having ratios of cash to individual deposits and net due to banks within a couple percentage points of the legal minimum reserve requirement. Decisions regarding cash holdings were presumably made by the bank in conjunction with both the bank's ability to obtain cash from their correspondents and other decisions about asset allocation and are thus endogenous and will need to be instrumented.
Balances held at banks in large cities, especially New York, were valuable for other reasons as well. Such balances could be used as part of the payment settlement process. Long-distance payments, such as those by merchants, were typically made either by draft or check. The transactions could be cleared by shifting balances between the correspondents of the bank of the party writing the check or draft and the bank of the party receiving the check, especially if those correspondents were in the same city (See James 1978 , James and Weiman 2010 , White 1983 . As nearly all banks had a correspondent in New York, drafts on New York banks were accepted nationwide and were vital for interregional payments. For payments within a region, balances held in regional centers could play a similar role.
To measure the potential value of deposits for these purposes. We use the ratio of checking deposits to total individual deposits; individual deposits that were not checking deposits were generally time deposits. Use of checking deposits versus time deposits is likely influenced primarily by customer preferences and we consider this variable to be exogenous.
A third benefit of balances with a reserve agent was the ability to obtain short-term funding from that agent. One way that banks could obtain short-term funding was by obtaining a short-term loan from another bank while posting a loan or other security as collateral (bills payable) or by selling one of its loans to another bank (rediscounting). Banks also borrowed by issuing collateralized certificates of deposit to other banks. Typically this type of borrowing carried higher interest rates and notable stigma was attached to it by country banks in the East but there was reportedly less stigma for country banks in the West and South (Lockhart 1921) . The lower stigma was perhaps due to the fact that such borrowing often occurred during crop moving season to finance the large seasonal borrowing needs. Our data indicate that a fair portion of this lending was done by borrowing from correspondents, although other banks were also involved. The correspondents reportedly did not attach much stigma to borrowing and some report that regular borrowing was viewed positively as it facilitated monitoring by allowing the lending bank regular insight into the types and quality of the loans made by the borrowing banks (Lockhart 1921) . 11 Conway and Patterson (1914, p. 95) report that correspondents typically were only willing to provide loans or rediscounts equal to four or five times the balances held with them. Thus preferences regarding potential borrowing could have a notable shape on the network.
In our analysis, we use an indicator for whether the bank borrowed from other banks or not. An indicator variable is preferred because borrowing tended to be either zero or be a fairly sizable amount;
thus, it appears that the decision to move beyond zero was important, but this discrete decision might be lost in the noise associated with the range of borrowing on the balance sheet. 12 The decision to use borrowed funds was likely affected by the ability of the correspondents to be able to provide financing and endogenous.
The fourth and final benefit of correspondents that we consider is their ability to provide a means by which banks could invest funds. Correspondents, particularly those in New York, typically invested a considerable portion of their funds in Call Loans made to stock brokers that were secured by stock and could be called at any time (Gendreau 1979 , White 1983 . When rates on call loans were elevated, correspondents enabled their respondent banks to invest directly in the call loan market. Additionally, correspondents acted as agents to allow their respondent banks to purchase corporate bonds or other securities and also provided information on the credit quality of the securities (James 1978 , Phillips 1924 While we cannot observe business opportunities directly, we can observe indicators of having a smaller set of options nearby. In particular, we use the ratio of non-treasury securities holdings to the sum of non-Treasury securities plus loans and discounts. This ratio indicates the degree to which the bank was getting its credit exposure by buying securities rather than through its loan choices. 13 We argue that our measure of credit exposure obtained through securities is more reflective of the lending environment faced by the bank rather than a choice made by the bank and is thus exogenous.
Section 4.2 Bank level items
The shape of the correspondent network would most likely be shaped by the general approach of the bank toward its interactions with other banks. In particular, the degree to which a bank had other banks as customers and was funded by interbank deposits would likely influence its use of correspondents, and conversely, the various connections to central reserve city banks it maintained could potentially influence whether other banks would seek to hold deposits at the bank. Thus, we estimate the importance of the deposits of other banks (as a ratio to assets) but also need to account for the fact that 12 Moreover, using total amounts would cause problems as these liabilities increase the balance sheet and thus decrease the ratio of due to banks as a portion of the balance sheet arithmetically. 13 As an alternative, we looked at whether the bank issued more than the legally required amount of notes. In the National Banking Era, banks were required to purchase a certain minimum amount of Treasury securities and issue a certain amount of notes. Banks earned a modest return on this endeavor, but it did require them to expend some balance sheet. Thus banks generally preferred to minimize note issuance. The banks that issued more notes than required to by law were generally those that were in areas with fewer good loan opportunities which made this alternative, low margin revenue stream more worthwhile (Calomiris and Mason 2008) . This alternative indicator variable produced generally similar qualitative results although they tended to be less statistically significant.
this variable is likely endogenous. Similarly, we will need to account for the share of bank assets that the bank held with other non-central reserve city banks (also endogenous).
Larger banks presumably had more business options and an ability to conduct more types of business. Thus, we would expect to see that larger banks would have more correspondents (consistent with Table 3 ). We control for size using log assets.
Another important control at the bank level reflects the ownership structure. Calomiris and Carlson (2014b) find that ownership structure is an important determinant of the amount of risk taken by the bank. They find that banks with more management ownership tended to be operated in a more conservative manner. They also find that these banks tended to use more cash and less capital as a means of managing risk. These risk preferences and preferences about cash holdings may also affect choices about network connections. To measure ownership structure, we use the fraction of outstanding equity shares owned by the top three managers: the president, vice-president, and cashier.
Section 4.3 Variables reflecting location attributes
Being a reserve city altered the legal environment for banks. It should have made it easier for banks to attract deposits from other banks, as those deposits could count as part of the reserve of those banks. However, being a bank in a reserve city also meant that only deposits with banks in central reserve cities could count toward their own legal reserve. Thus, whether the bank was in a reserve city is an important control. (We tried estimating a number of the regressions separately for reserve city and country banks but did not find many notable differences between these groups.)
As suggested by the Table 3 , distance likely influenced choices regarding reserve agents. Being closer to a reserve city may have increased its attractiveness as there may well have been more trade between the local city and that reserve city. Additionally, proximity would likely have facilitated moving cash between the bank and its agents, which might have made it better from liquidity management perspective. Alternatively, greater distance may have increased the value of having an agent in a far off city as it would enable the bank to transact at least some types of business in more distant locations. We thus include the log distance from each of the three central reserve cities in the regressions. There may be notable non-linearities associated with distance, so we also add an indicator for whether the bank is located on the Pacific Coast.
The local customer base may also have influenced the network linkages chosen by the bank.
(These are in addition to the bank customers discussed above.) Business customers may have valued banks that could better enable them to conduct trade in particular places. To the extent that different businesses may have conducted commerce with different locations, more businesses in the area may have encouraged banks to establish connections in relatively more places. Thus, we include in our analysis the number of manufacturing firms in the county as reported in the 1890 census.
We also include the population of the county (again from the 1890 census). One might expect that a larger population would have a greater variety of needs and thus be associated with more network connections.
Agricultural areas may also have had particular needs. Various scholars have documented the seasonal flows of money through the financial system associated with harvest season (Kemmerer 1910 , Miron 1986 ). More heavily agricultural areas may therefore have had different needs with respect to the financial system. As a measure of the agricultural intensity of the area, we include the ratio of agricultural income to agricultural income plus manufacturing income at the state level.
Section 5. Role of various factors in shaping bank networks
In this section, we present our analysis of the relationship between these explanatory factors and the shape of bank correspondent networks. Before doing so, we discuss our instrumental variables approach for dealing with the variables about which we noted endogeneity concerns in the previous section; this involves describing our instruments and presenting the first stage regressions.
Section 5.1 Endogenous variables, instruments, and first stage regressions.
As noted in the previous section, there are several important variables where we have endogeneity concerns: due to banks, due from banks, the indicator for holding low cash reserves, and the indicator for using borrowed funds. To deal with these endogeneity concerns, we exploit information about the governance of the bank that are available in the examiner report. Decisions about the operations of the bank, such as balances maintained at correspondents, would be made by the President of the bank and the Cashier who was effectively the chief operating officer (Alcorn 1908, Bolles 1890, Coffin 1896).
The shareholders on the Board of Directors that were not a part of the management team, which we refer to as outside directors, could influence the general character of the bank-and thus the potentially endogenous variables about which we are concerned-but not the specific details related to the bank networks.
For instance, the occupations of the outside shareholders on the Board likely influenced preferences about the types of loans made and the general composition of the liabilities. Having more outside board members that were farmers, or in a related agricultural occupation such as operating a grain elevator, presumably increased the likelihood that the bank made agricultural loans or needed to use borrowed funds as part of the seasonal swings in lending. However, these directors were unlikely to be able to influence choices about correspondent networks beyond the indirect connections through their impact on borrowing. Outside directors that were involved in real estate were more likely to borrow from the bank than directors with other occupations; thus it seems likely that they would have had preferences about whether the bank was providing more loans or was keeping more resources on deposit with other banks. Capitalists, the most common occupation for outside directors, presumably had preferences about the profitability of the bank, and thus about both the reliance on other banks as a source of funding as well as on making loans versus placing money with other banks. Thus, we use the log of the number of directors on the Board in each of these occupations as instruments.
Several other instruments are derived from the oversight procedures used by the Board to constrain risk taking by management. For instance, whether the cashier or president posted a bond to insure against bad behavior, such as fraud, may have impacted their other behaviors, such as reliance on borrowed money. Other types of oversight, such as whether there was an independent committee to review loans made by the management or the frequency of board meetings-we use whether it met at least monthly-likely affected the amount of cash that the bank kept on hand. All these devices are again expected to impact certain balance sheet items, but seem unlikely to impact the network structure.
Bank examinations took place year round. There were also notable seasonal fluctuations in bank behavior which were driven by needs to move crops (James 1978 , Kemmerer 1910 , Lockhart 1921 , Miron 1986 ). For instance, Calomiris and Carlson (2014b) find elevated borrowing during the late fall and winter. As the time of year when the examination occurred might affect the likelihood that the bank was using borrowed funds, we include a dummy for crop moving season (defined as October through Jaunary).
The final instruments we use compare each bank to its immediate neighbors. One comparison variable is the "paid in capital" of the bank relative to the "paid in capital" of other banks in the city. The second is the age of the bank relative to the age of the other banks in the city. Banks may have been more willing to deposit funds in banks with a larger equity cushion or in older banks about which they may have had more information. Thus, we expect that these variables should impact the due to banks as a share of assets. It is unlikely that these variables would directly impact the correspondent network structure chosen by the bank.
The first stage regressions are shown in Table 4 . Given the way our regressions will be structured, we use all the instruments in each first stage regression. 14 In general, the instruments have the expected impact on the endogenous variables. Having more board members involved with the harvest is associated with a higher likelihood of using borrowed funds as well as with having lower cash reserves.
Banks with more capitalists also tended to have more interbank deposits. (Bank deposits paid interest rates of 2 percent. Rates paid on time deposits were sometimes reported in the Examiner Reports; these rates averaged 4.25 percent for the banks in our sample with a minimum of 2.25 percent. So bank deposits were potentially viewed as a reasonably cheap source of funding.) Banks with more directors involved with real estate finance tended to have lower ratios of due from banks to assets, again perhaps because they preferred to make more loans. Banks where the president was bonded tended to have lower cash.
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Banks where the cashier is bonded were less likely to use borrowed money and had lower interbank balances-both in terms of due from other banks and due to other banks. Banks with an independent loan committee were less likely to use borrowed funds and banks where the board met more frequently tended to have less due from other banks. Banks with relatively more capital paid in compared to nearby banks were less likely to have low cash reserves and to have lower ratios of due from other banks relative to assets. Relatively older banks were also less likely to have low cash reserves and, rather surprisingly, also had smaller ratios of due from other banks relative to assets.
Section 5.2 Banking operations and the shape of the correspondent network
We now turn to assessing the role the various factors we identified played in shaping the correspondent networks of the banks. We first look at their role in determining the general importance of connections with central reserve city correspondents measured by the portion of due from banks that consisted of balances at central reserve city agents and by the number of central reserve city agents (Table   5 ). We then look at what influenced the banks to prefer to hold balances in New York relative to Chicago or St. Louis (Table 6 ). In Table 7 , we present an analysis related to the number of agents used in each central reserve city: multiple agents versus a single agent in New York and whether at least one agent was maintained in each of the other two central reserve cities. An examination of the role different factors played in determining the concentration of balances in a single agent appears in Table 8 . For country banks, we also look at the number of reserve cities in which they had an agent (Table 9 ). Rather than discussing each table independently, we discuss the role of each independent (or instrumented) variable in shaping the overall network across different regressions. Doing so provides a more coherent narrative for how the variables mattered.
One of the factors that appears to have shaped the networks is the nature of the individual deposits held at the bank. We find that banks that held more checking deposits relative to their total independent deposits tended to concentrate their deposits, particularly with New York reserve agents.
This can be seen in Table 6 , where more checking deposits are associated with a higher share of total funds due from central reserve city banks that are held in New York, as well as in Table 5 , which indicates that banks with more checking deposits tended to have fewer agents. These findings are rather striking in light of the fact that having more checking deposits is also associated with a higher general proportion of assets that were held as due from banks (Table 4 ). These findings suggest that there may have been some benefits to banks in holding more deposits at a few institutions that did most of their clearing.
Banks that had more private securities relative to total private exposures (loans, overdrafts, and private securities), which again we take as a proxy for fewer local lending opportunities, also tended to place more of their central reserve city balances in New York (Table 6 ). They also tended to have correspondents in fewer reserve cities (Table 10 ). However, these banks did not concentrate their funds with a particular agent, but instead tended to have more agents in New York (Table 7) . These findings are consistent with the literature that suggests that correspondents provided a means of investing funds.
Further, James (1978) and Phillips (1924) report that correspondents produced credit analyses of the securities being offered in public markets so having more correspondents in New York would have given banks more opinions and more options when choosing investments.
Banks with low cash, for whom the deposits at reserve agents would have been more important for managing legal reserve requirements, tended to hold more of their interbank deposits in central reserve cities (Table 6 ). Given the legal differences in whether balances in reserve city banks could count, we tested whether this relationship was similar for banks in reserve cities and country banks by estimating this regression separately for the two groups of banks. We found similar effects in both regressions.
Relying more on balances with reserve agents to meet reserve requirements does not appear to have impacted how many agents the bank had.
Banks that used borrowed money tended to have fewer correspondents (Table 6 ) and to have concentrated these balances at a single institution (Table 8) . These borrowing were almost always secured (Conway and Patterson 1921), so banks might have found it advantageous to keep collateral at a smaller number of agents rather than having to keep collateral accounts at multiple institutions.
We find that banks that relied more on interbank deposits as a source of funding concentrated their own central reserve city balances in New York.
Distance played a notable role in network decisions. This effect is most obvious in Table 6 and Curiously, distance to the central reserve cities seems to have had only a modest impact on the number of central reserve city agents used (Table 5 ) with banks farther from New York tending to have a slightly higher number of agents and being on the Pacific Coast reducing the proportion of interbank balances held in the central reserve cities. From Table 8 , we observe that banks farther from New York were less likely to concentrate their central reserve city balances at a single institution.
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Having more potential manufacturing firm customers is associated with having more agents (Table 6 ) and having agents in more places (as this increased the likelihood of having an agent St. Louis, Table 7 , and of having correspondents in more reserve cities, Table 9 ). To the extent that different businesses will transact in different places, these findings are consistent with the idea that banks maintained more correspondent relationships to cater to their business clients (or potential business clients). A larger county population appears to have little effect other than to reduce the likelihood of having a correspondent in St. Louis.
Banks in reserve cities were not very different than the other banks in our sample, although they kept somewhat smaller shares of the central reserve city balances in New York and concentrated their deposits at a single correspondent a bit more.
Larger banks had more correspondents. This is clear in the outright number (Table 6 ) and by the fact that they were more likely to have an agent in St. Louis (Table 7) . With the greater distribution of agents, these banks naturally had lower balances in New York, especially relative to all balances in central reserve cities (Table 6 ).
Section 6. Correspondent networks and the Panic of 1893
The Panic of 1893 was one of the most severe in the National Banking Era. More banks closed permanently during this panic than after any of the other panics of the era. Various scholars have pointed to a number of causes of the panic and they range from financial instability associated with worries about the U.S. commitment to the gold standard to a decline in economic activity and increase in corporate bankruptcies (see Carlson 2013 for a discussion). The panic prompted banks to convert their interbank deposits into cash. Partly in response to the elevated redemption requests, banks in New York City suspended the ability of depositors to convert deposits held there into cash (Wicker 2006) . 17 Suspending convertibility prevented forced liquidation of many of the loans extended by the New York banks to stock brokers which would have resulted in the liquidation of equities at firesale prices and triggered bankruptcies of many brokers. However, the suspension also meant that banks elsewhere in the country 16 Given the smaller samples used in Table 8 and Table 9 , we dropped some of the distance measures. 17 Carlson (2015) suggests that concerns about suspension on the part of New York banks may have prompted banks in reserve and country cities to withdraw even faster and thus reinforcing the run on New York.
had some of their more liquid assets forcefully changed into illiquid assets. This loss of access to liquid assets may have contributed to spreading the crisis.
In this section, we test whether bank network connections, and especially those related to deposits in New York, played a role in spreading the crisis. To determine whether interbank networks mattered in the panic, we test whether holding more balances with central reserve city agents is associated with an increased likelihood that the bank closed during the panic. An important dimension to a banking panic is that there is a large scale test by bank liability holders of the ability of banks to meet their obligations.
Thus, we focus on the proportion of the liquid assets of the bank-defined as cash assets and due from banks (not just agents)-held in the central reserve cities. As some of the results in Section 5 suggest that deposits in New York may work somewhat differently from deposits in other central reserve cities, we look separately at balances held in New York banks and at balances held at either Chicago or St. Louis banks.
The other aspect of the panic of 1893 that we need to take account of is the suspension of deposit redemptions by New York banks that occurred partway through the panic (the panic starts in May but the suspension in New York did not occur until August). The impact of balances held in New York, and in the other central reserve cities, presumably changed following that event. Thus we identify whether a bank closed before or after the suspension in New York and analyze these groups separately.
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One of the types of liabilities that tended to get drawn down most quickly in a panic is interbank deposits. 19 This category might be especially important and volatile for our group of banks to the extent that these deposits were part of the connection of country banks to the interbank system and were used for liquidity and payment services. To account for the possibility that deposits held in central reserve cities were more likely to result in troubles for the banks that had lots of interbank deposits of their own, we interact the ratio of interbank deposits due to other banks to assets with the ratio of liquid assets held in the central reserve cities.
We continue to include the variables reflecting business needs associated with the services provided by central reserve city agents and the location-related variables. For the purpose of the analysis here we treat these variables as exogenous as they are unrelated to the unexpected shock of the panic. We also add some further controls for the condition of the bank. We include the ratio of net worth to assets and the ratio of other real estate owned to assets. The former ratio is a measure of leverage. Other real estate owned was typically real estate collateral that was seized when loans went bad, so this ratio is indicative of asset quality. We also include relative age, as new banks were often risker. During the crisis it became clear that the U.S. would stop purchasing silver and the price of silver dropped. This in turn caused the closure of many silver mines and related businesses and, consequently, may have put additional strains on banks in these areas (Carlson 2013). To account for this effect, we include an indicator for whether the state had considerable mining activity.
Our results showing the impact of interbank connections on the likelihood that a bank closed in the early stage of the crisis (prior to the suspension of redemptions in New York) are shown in Table 10 .
We find that banks more dependent on interbank deposits as a funding source and that also kept a greater portion of their liquid assets in New York were considerably more likely to close. We do not find that deposits held in Chicago or St. Louis mattered in the same way. These findings suggest that banks who were important in the interbank market and that acted as a conduit between other banks and New York were the most vulnerable. This result is consistent with some of the stories reported in Wicker (2000) of runs on banks that were important in the interbank system.
The impact of balances held in the other central reserve cities appears to shift in the wake of the suspension of New York. In the latter part of the panic, balances in any central reserve cities increased the likelihood of suspension (Table 11) . Moreover, the impact of balances held there seems independent of the degree to which the bank was funded by interbank deposits. Additionally, we find that the impact is larger for banks that were located father away from the central reserve cities. This latter finding further suggests that our results are related to liquidity and banks that were not able to access these funds quickly suffered.
The effects of the other variables in the regression are about as expected. Banks that relied more on borrowed money were more likely to close, especially late in the panic, as has been found in many other studies. Banks that relied more on checking deposits in individual funding were less likely to close; this finding is similar to the finding by Ramirez and Zandbergen (2013) who find that time deposits were particularly volatile. 20 As expected, banks with more other real estate owned were more likely to close.
Larger banks were less likely to close, as were banks located in reserve cities. Consistent with Calomiris and Carlson (2014b), we find that banks with higher management ownership were somewhat less likely to close. Finally, and also as expected, we find that banks in states with more mining were more likely to close.
Section 7. Conclusion
The interbank system was an extremely important part of banking operations in the US in the late 1800s. Banks depended on this system to clear payments, obtain short-term financing, meet reserve requirements, and to provide an alternative source of investment if local opportunities were insufficient.
Further, as banks were limited to a single office in a single location, the smooth functioning of this system was essential for commerce which was expanding rapidly as transportation costs fell. This paper contributes importantly to our understanding of the way the system looked and the why it had the shape that it did.
While all banks connected to this network to some degree, some connected considerably more than others. We find that the services offered by the correspondent banks in conjunction with the business model of the bank were important in shaping the banks connection to the network. For instance, banks for whom access to payment clearing services or to investment opportunities were particularly important tended to link most strongly with New York. Banks more dependent on borrowing money from other banks tended to establish fewer, more concentrated, relationships. Larger banks, and banks in areas with more potential business clients tended to seek more, and more diverse, interbank relationships.
While the operation of the system in good times was beneficial, during stress situations, it could be a source of instability. Banks that were intermediaries within the banking system, in that they both were the recipients of more deposits from other banks and had more balances in New York banks, appear to have suffered more during the initial stages of the Panic of 1893. Difficulty accessing liquidity held off-site also proved problematic. Thus, the interbank system appears to have been a source of contagion during the panic. Balances with CRC estimated using IV-least squares regressions. Regression involving total number of agents estimated using an IV Poisson regression. Standard errors in parentheses. 
